27 ideas
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |