23 ideas
5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |