31 ideas
7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |