Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' and 'The Gay (Joyful) Science'

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61 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin]
It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche]
Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche]
Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche]