19 ideas
14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |