Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction' and 'works'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter]