16 ideas
| 5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
| 7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
| 10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
| 7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
| 5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
| 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
| 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
| 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
| 7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
| 5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
| 5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
| 5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
| 5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |