18 ideas
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
22442 | If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant] |
22441 | The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |