13 ideas
8964 | Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
8961 | Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
8963 | Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |