Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?', 'The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap' and 'Causal Explanation'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa]