22 ideas
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa] |
18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa] |