18 ideas
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |