15 ideas
21405 | Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral [Cicero, by Long] |
20871 | Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly [Cicero] |
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
6031 | The essence of propriety is consistency [Cicero] |