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All the ideas for 'Conditionals', 'Relativism' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82'

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68 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / d. Contemporary philosophy
There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady]
The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche]
The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche]
The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche]
Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche]
Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche]
The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady]