14 ideas
| 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington] |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
| 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington] |
| 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington] |
| 9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 21278 | All the signs of design found in a watch are also found in nature [Paley] |
| 21277 | Even an imperfect machine can exhibit obvious design [Paley] |
| 21275 | Unlike a stone, the parts of a watch are obviously assembled in order to show the time [Paley] |
| 21276 | From the obvious purpose and structure of a watch we must infer that it was designed [Paley] |
| 21357 | No organ shows purpose more obviously than the eyelid [Paley] |