Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Properties', 'Letters to Descartes' and 'Higher-Order Logic'

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17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro]
If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro]
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
A soul with physical extension is more likely than an immaterial soul that moves bodies [Elizabeth]