Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Properties', 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' and 'Experience First (and reply)'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

9182	Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties

18430

We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates

18432

Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

18437

Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

18434

That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding

19542

It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]

19543

To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First

19541

Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

9181	The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]