Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemological Disjunctivism', 'Truth-makers and dependence' and 'Reality is Not What it Seems'

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36 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli]
There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli]
The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli]
Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli]