21 ideas
| 19504 | My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D] |
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 19503 | An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D] |
| 19505 | Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG] |
| 19499 | We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D] |
| 19500 | Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D] |
| 19502 | Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D] |
| 19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
| 19506 | Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D] |
| 19496 | Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D] |
| 19497 | Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D] |
| 19495 | Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D] |
| 19501 | We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D] |
| 19507 | Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
| 8404 | Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H] |
| 8401 | Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H] |
| 8400 | Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H] |
| 8402 | The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H] |