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All the ideas for 'Epistemological Disjunctivism', 'Contributions of Philosophy (On Appropriation)' and 'Philosophy of Logic'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes]
Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine]