Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemological Disjunctivism', 'Could There Be Unicorns?' and 'Capital Vol. 3'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19504 My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
16951 It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16953 Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
16952 If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
16960 If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
16958 In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
19503 An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16957 Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
16959 If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19505 Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19499 We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
19500 Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
19502 Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19498 Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19506 Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
19496 Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
19497 Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19495 Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
19501 We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19507 Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
16956 To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
21996 Freedom only comes when labour is no longer necessary [Marx]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
16954 Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]