Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concepts', 'Reference and Essence (1st edn)' and 'Contributions of Philosophy (On Appropriation)'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
15586 When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
11147 Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
18889 Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14627 S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
18888 Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
11141 Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
11142 Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
11121 Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
11120 Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
11122 A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
11124 Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
11123 Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
11125 The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
11140 Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
11128 Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
11130 Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
11129 The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
11131 It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
11132 The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
11133 Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
11134 People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
11135 Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
11136 Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
11137 The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
11138 The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
11139 Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
11146 People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18886 Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18887 The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
18891 Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]