65 ideas
| 12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
| 12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
| 12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
| 12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
| 12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
| 12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
| 12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
| 10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
| 9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
| 10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
| 10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
| 10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
| 10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
| 10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
| 10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
| 10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
| 10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
| 10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
| 10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
| 10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
| 10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
| 10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
| 10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
| 10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
| 9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
| 9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
| 9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
| 9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
| 9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
| 9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
| 9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
| 14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
| 9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
| 9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
| 9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
| 9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
| 9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
| 10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
| 9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
| 9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
| 9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
| 9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
| 12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
| 12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
| 9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
| 12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
| 12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
| 9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
| 12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
| 9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
| 9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
| 9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
| 9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
| 9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
| 23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
| 9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |