57 ideas
14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |