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All the ideas for 'Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths', 'Letters to Samuel Clarke' and 'fragments/reports'

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34 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Xenocrates held that the soul had no form or substance, but was number [Xenocrates, by Cicero]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]