Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths', 'Tarski's Theory of Truth' and 'Mathematical Physics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

28 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
10825 The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
10820 In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13499 Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
10818 Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10170 While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10166 ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10175 Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10819 Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10827 Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10165 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10174 Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10164 Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10172 Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10167 Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
10169 Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
10179 There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
10181 Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
10182 There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
10168 Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
10178 Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
10176 Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
10177 Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10171 The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
10173 A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
10826 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9567 Maths deals with quantities of physical significance, ignoring irrelevant features [Geroch]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]