31 ideas
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
6368 | If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz] |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |