46 ideas
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
23688 | Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright] |