98 ideas
| 20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
| 19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
| 19073 | True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel] |
| 15624 | Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel] |
| 15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
| 15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
| 21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
| 21984 | We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel] |
| 22081 | Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel] |
| 15626 | Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel] |
| 15616 | If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel] |
| 15638 | Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel] |
| 21767 | Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel] |
| 15639 | Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel] |
| 15615 | Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel] |
| 20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
| 20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
| 19070 | Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel] |
| 5644 | In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 19072 | In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel] |
| 19071 | The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel] |
| 10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
| 10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
| 21595 | Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel] |
| 10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
| 15628 | The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel] |
| 15629 | Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel] |
| 15630 | Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel] |
| 10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
| 10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
| 10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
| 10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
| 10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
| 10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
| 10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
| 10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
| 10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
| 10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
| 10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
| 10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
| 10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 22078 | Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel] |
| 15634 | Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel] |
| 10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
| 21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
| 15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
| 15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
| 20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
| 20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
| 20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
| 20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
| 20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
| 15636 | The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel] |
| 22300 | Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel] |
| 15609 | The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel] |
| 15625 | Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel] |
| 15619 | Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel] |
| 15620 | Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel] |
| 15622 | Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel] |
| 15621 | Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel] |
| 15632 | The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel] |
| 20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
| 20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
| 20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
| 20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
| 20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
| 20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
| 20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
| 20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
| 20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
| 15623 | Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel] |
| 20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
| 15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
| 15608 | The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel] |
| 20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
| 21986 | Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 15607 | We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel] |
| 15610 | Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel] |
| 20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
| 20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
| 20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
| 20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
| 20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
| 20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
| 20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
| 20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
| 20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
| 20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
| 20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
| 20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |
| 15614 | Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel] |
| 15618 | If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel] |
| 15635 | The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel] |
| 21980 | God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel] |
| 15633 | We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel] |