79 ideas
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |