54 ideas
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |