48 ideas
| 15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
| 15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
| 10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
| 10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
| 10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
| 10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
| 10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
| 10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
| 10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
| 10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
| 10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
| 10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
| 10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
| 10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
| 10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
| 10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
| 10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
| 10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
| 15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
| 15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
| 15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
| 15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
| 15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
| 15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| 15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
| 15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
| 15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
| 15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
| 10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
| 15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
| 15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| 15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
| 15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
| 15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
| 15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
| 15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
| 21912 | Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB] |
| 21911 | Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB] |
| 15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
| 15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
| 15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
| 15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
| 15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
| 15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| 15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
| 15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |