29 ideas
15957 | Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle] |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
15965 | Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
16735 | In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau] |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
16034 | Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle] |
15953 | To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle] |
15962 | Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
15964 | Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
15960 | Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle] |
20195 | Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Hursthouse, by Zagzebski] |
15952 | The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
15972 | The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |