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All the ideas for 'Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths', 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience' and 'Empty Names'

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29 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10170 While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10166 ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18935 Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18934 Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
18938 Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
18947 Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10175 Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10165 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10174 Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10164 Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10172 Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10167 Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
10169 Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
10179 There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
10181 Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price]
10182 There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
10168 Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
10178 Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
10176 Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price]
10177 Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10171 The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16052 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
16053 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16056 Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16054 Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
16055 Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
10173 A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
16057 Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]