40 ideas
13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |