Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Causation'', 'Understanding and Essence' and 'True in Theory, but not in Practice'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant]
There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant]
A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]