Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Causation'', 'De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)' and 'Abstraction Reconsidered'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
13070 If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11197 The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10735 Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
11195 If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
11201 Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
11205 If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13090 The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11202 It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11196 Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11208 A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11198 Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10732 If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
8329 Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
10731 For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
10733 The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
10734 Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
11206 The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8324 The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8328 Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
8327 If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
11207 A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8330 Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8325 The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]