Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'The Good State' and 'Mental Events'

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29 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Politics is driven by power cliques [Grayling]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is essential for democracy that voting is free and well informed [Grayling]
Democracies should require a supermajority for major questions [Grayling]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
A cap on time of service would restrict party control and career ambitions [Grayling]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Majority decisions are only acceptable if the minority interests are not vital [Grayling]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled [Grayling]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The very concept of democracy entails a need for justice [Grayling]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
There should be separate legislative, executive and judicial institutions [Grayling]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]