Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Things', 'De Re and De Dicto' and 'Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences'

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15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]