Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence', 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete' and 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13917 Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
13919 Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
13918 Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13804 A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
13805 Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13808 A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
13806 Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
13921 All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13807 A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
13809 One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13922 Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13920 Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9086 The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
9087 Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
9085 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9084 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]