Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Proslogion' and 'Actualism and Possible Worlds'

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23 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]