Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Proslogion' and 'Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason'

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20 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20033 Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20034 Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20026 Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20032 Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
21241 Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
21243 An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
21244 Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
21242 If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
1421 A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
21245 The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
21246 Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
21247 Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
1420 Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]