Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Confessions' and 'Philosophical Investigations'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


82 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein]
If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein]
To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Everyone wants happiness [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon]
Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine]
If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein]