Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Essence and Potentiality' and 'works'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10397 Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
10396 If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
10395 Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
15384 Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
8481 The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
15385 Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
15383 Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
10398 Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]