Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Shame and Necessity' and 'Being You'

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24 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
23513 Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth]
23514 The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
23516 Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
23519 The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
23518 Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
23517 Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23515 Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]