13 ideas
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 20444 | If paintings could be perfectly duplicated, it would be a multiple art form [Currie, by Bacharach] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |