20 ideas
6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |