18 ideas
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |