20 ideas
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
16235 | Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
14753 | The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16072 | 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
14751 | Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16071 | Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
16234 | Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
13278 | Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki] |
14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |