19 ideas
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |