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All the ideas for 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?', 'Particle Physics' and 'The Rationality of Science'

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR]
The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR]
The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR]
Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR]
The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR]